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Abstract
A significant union presence in the Las Vegas, Nevada Hotel, Gaming, and
Recreation (HGR) industry juxtaposed to the near absence of unions in the
Reno, Nevada segment of the same industry is used to study how unions affect
wages both within the industry and in a much less unionized sector, the
Wholesale and Retail Trade (WRT) industry. The results indicate that median
wages of highly unionized occupations in the Las Vegas HGR industry are
significantly higher than wages of identical occupations in Reno. Little
difference in wages is observed in the WRT industries of the two regions. In
light of recent government scrutiny of gaming in the United States, managers
must become more sensitive to alleged negative socio-economic impacts of
their operations. Higher wages as a result of unionization may mitigate one
element of such alleged effects.
Keywords: Hotel and Casino Industry; Union Wage Effects; Service Sector
Employment
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Recently, the National Gaming Impact Study Commission (1999),
established by Public Law 104-169, investigated the multidimensional impacts
of gaming on customers, workers, and communities across the United States.
Many industry analysts predicted that the Commission's findings would become
a catalyst for extending federal regulation into the industry based on findings
and perceptions that unacceptably high social and economic costs accompany
the operation of gaming enterprises. According to some researchers, such costs
range from psycho- and socio-pathologies related to compulsive gambling to
labor market distress because of the abundance of jobs created in the hotelcasino sector that are potentially unstable, part-time, low paying, and offer few
fringe benefits (Alexander, 1998; Thomson, Gaze!, and Rickman, 1997;
Waddoups, 2000a).
In light of the Commission's findings, it appears that owners and managers
ofhotel-gaming operations may find it in their self interest to become more
sensitive to the impact of their enterprises on social and economic well-being of
the communities in which they operate. More importantly, industry leaders must
pay more attention to potential negative external effects of their enterprises and
find methods to minimize such costs. A strategy of denial or avoidance of selfUNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal • Volume 6, Issue 1
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scrutiny is likely short-sighted, and may invite costly economic and political fallout
similar to that recently experienced by the tobacco industry.
Of course, managers of hotel-gaming operations must be sensitive to a complex array
of overlapping and often conflicting interests, which include interests of stockholders,
political leaders, community groups, workers, unions, and their customers. If a critical
mass of community interests comes to believe that gaming enterprises generate more
social and economic costs than benefits for their communities, increased government
intervention and control will likely follow.
When socio-economic costs are examined in the context of gaming, the discussion
generally has focused on pathological gambling and the accompanying costs borne by the
community. In contrast, the present study addresses social and economic costs and
benefits from the perspective of employees. If a substantial proportion of hotel-casino
employees work in jobs that pay at or below the poverty level, socio-economic costs
stemming from inadequate health care, lack of affordable housing, family instability, lack
of resources for child care, among others, are borne by the workers, their dependents, and
the community. 1 Such costs are especially salient for communities with a relatively large
proportion of employment attributable to the gaming industry.
More specifically, the present study addresses the ability of labor unions to increase
wages of front-line hotel-casino workers. By comparing occupational wages in a highly
unionized (Las Vegas) with a location virtually union-free (Reno), union impact on wages
is assessed. If substantially higher wages are observed in the unionized location while
poverty level wages are observed in the less unionized area, then unions may be
understood, in part, as institutions that reduce the social and economic costs connected
with low wage employment.
Undoubtedly managers are reluctant to accept contractual restrictions that
unionization places on their ability to operate. Furthermore, stockholders generally prefer
higher short-term profits that generally accrue in the absence of unions. However, if
increased economic stability for a significant portion of the community's residents
accompanies union scale wages and benefits, then social and economic costs that may
otherwise have been borne by the community can be avoided. Reduction in such costs
will likely increase the industry's acceptability to community residents, which in turn
raises the probability that it will continue to thrive economically in the long term.
The findings reported in the present study are relevant to hotel-casino managers and
union leaders, who both have a direct interest in maintaining the long run viability of the
industry. In addition, policy makers, who make regulatory decisions affecting the
industry, and academic researchers, who study managerial and socio-economic issues
connected with the hospitality industry, should also find the study of interest.

Unions and Wages from the Perspective of Economic Studies
Economists and industrial relations scholars have demonstrated quite conclusively
that unions raise the wages of the workers they represent (Freeman & Medoff, 1984;
Hirsch & Macpherson, 1997). Evidence of the union wage effect on workers without
union coverage, however, is not so clear. Such ambiguity arises because unions in a labor
market affect nonunion wages while they raise union wages. For example, citing the
union threat effect, some economists have suggested that firms that prefer to remain
nonunion will increase wages of nonunion workers strategically to reduce the probability

1

For example, Waddoups (1999a) studied patterns of uncompensated health care among patients and guarantors at the local
public hospital in Las Vegas, which provides approximately one-half of the uncompensated health care in the area. As the
location's only safety-net hospital, it must treat patients regardless of their ability to pay. The study revealed that workers
employed in hotel-casino jobs at "Strip" properties, a highly unionized location, were substantially more likely to pay their
medical bills than workers employed in off- "Strip'" hotel-casinos, which are mostly nonunion. The lack of affordable benefits
for workers and their dependents in off- "Strip" establishments is the likely reason for the difference. Costs associated with
uncompensated health care are transferred from firms, which pay low wages and provide no benefits, to the community
through higher prices for medical care, higher insurance premiums, and higher taxes than would otherwise be observed.
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of a successful union organizing drive. 2 Unions may also raise the relative
wages of nonunion workers through increased consumer demand at nonunion
firms. The demand for nonunion workers is theorized to increase because
consumers shift from goods and services produced in the (presumably) higher
cost union sector toward goods and services produced in the (presumably) lower
cost nonunion sector. Such a substitution is expected to increase the demand for
nonunion labor and put upward pressure on wages in the nonunion sector, other
things equal.
Labor economists have also formulated the wage relativity hypothesis to
explain why union and nonunion workers' wages do not diverge more than is
currently observed. For example, Freeman & Medoff(1981) suggested that
nonunion workers in an industry with substantial unionization observe wages in
the union sector and set their labor supply price accordingly. Nonunion firms are
forced to raise wages closer to the union scale to elicit the necessary effective
labor supply. Workers who see the union scale as fair will not provide the same
level of quality adjusted work for significantly less compensation.
Researchers have also hypothesized that unions affect nonunion wages
through a spillover effect. The spillover hypothesis suggests that if unions
increase the price of labor, one would expect disemployment in the union sector.
Reduced demand for workers in the union sector in tum increases the supply of
labor available to the nonunion sector, which is expected to depress wages of
nonunion workers relative to their unionized counterparts. Although the
disemployment envisaged in the union spillover model may remain within the
highly unionized industry, it may also be diffused broadly across industries that
demand labor of similar skill levels (Cain, Becker, McLaughlin, & Schwenk,
1981, pp. 225-226). Herz ( 1990), for example, reported that one-half of the
workers displaced in 1983-88 (not necessarily because of high union wages)
who later became re-employed, took jobs in another industries. Thus, if
disemployment occurs because of high union wages, increased labor supply may
be observed in the nonunion sector, not only in the industry in question, but in
an array of industries that use the same quality of labor as the highly unionized
industry.
In industries outside the highly unionized industry, where the threat of
unionization may not be credible, the spillover effect may be a more dominant
factor. The predicted net effect would be a relative decline in wages in such
industries. Declining wages as a result of the spillover effect would be
especially likely if collective bargaining were structured along industrial lines,
as is the case in Nevada's Hotel, Gaming, and Recreation (HGR) industry.

The HGR Sector in Nevada
The above review of how the presence of unions in an industry may affect
wages suggests that such effects run through a number of channels. A case study
of union wage effects was conducted that focuses specifically on two industries
and two cities- The HGR and Wholesale and Retail Trade (WRT) industries in
Las Vegas and Reno, the two metropolitan areas ofNevada. 3 The study of
unions and wages in these two local industries and cities is compelling for a
number of reasons. First, the structure of the two industries and their patterns of
unionization make it amenable for examining how occupational wages in a less
: Hundley (1987) presented a formal model of firm behavior in response to the union threat. Curme &
Macpherson "s ( 1991) fmdings provide empirical support for the model.
3
The WRT industry is chosen as a comparative because its occupational configuration most closely matches the
configuration in HGR. Other industries defined in the state wage survey data that proved less useful for
comparison purposes are "Mining," "Manufacturing," "Transportation. Communications and Public Utilities,'"
"Finance, Insurance and Real Estate," "Services (excluding HGR)," "State Government," and "Local
Government."
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unionized labor market, like the HGR industry in Reno, differ from HGR wages in Las
Vegas, a more highly unionized sector.
Both locations owe a substantial part of their employment to the HGR industry. In
Clark County, home of Las Vegas, 26.4 percent of direct employment is located in the
HGR industry (Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation
(NDETR), 1996). 4 Of the estimated 144,979 jobs in the HGR industry at the time nearly
45,000 were covered by union contracts. 5 Workers in Las Vegas's hotel industry who
were not covered under a union contract also benefit from working in a highly unionized
branch of the industry. Nonunion workers in Las Vegas earned approximately 40 percent
more than their nonunion counterparts elsewhere in the U.S., while their unionized
counterparts earn similar wages to other unionized hotel workers elsewhere in the U.S.
(Waddoups, 1999c). The resulting union-nonunion wage differential for workers outside
of managerial, professional, and technical employment in Las Vegas is virtually
nonexistent. The relative equality of wages across union and nonunion establishments
suggests that some combination of the threat, nonunion demand, and wage relativity
effects outweigh the spillover effect. Thus wages of union and nonunion workers in Las
Vegas converge at a relatively high level. 6
In stark contrast to the highly unionized HGR industry in Las Vegas, the industry in
Reno located approximately 500 miles to the northwest is largely nonunion, and provides
a unique opportunity for a comparative analysis. An interview with a union official in
Reno revealed that only one hotel property (Circus Circus) with a bargaining unit of
approximately 500 workers operated under a union contract in 1996. Five-hundred
workers fill about 1.6 percent of the HGR jobs in Reno, a number that amounts to an
estimated 30,584 (see Table 1). Compare a 1.6 percent union coverage rate in Reno to
Las Vegas, where roughly 31 percent of the entire H GR workforce is covered. Although
the HGR industry accounts for proportionally less employment in Reno, its estimated 18
percent share of employment is not trivial, and clearly makes it a major center of hotelcasino employment in both the state and the nation.
Second, the configuration of the two industries and labor markets allows one to
address whether the high level of unionization in Las Vegas's HGR sector exerts any
discernable impact on wages in the WRT industry through threat, nonunion demand,
wage relativity, or spillover effects. The WRT industries in both locations are not highly
unionized and compete for less-skilled labor with the HGR industries from the same
local labor markets. 7 If threat, nonunion demand, and/or wage relativity effects extend
across industry boundaries and outweigh spillover effects, then one would expect
occupational wages in the Las Vegas's WRT industry to be higher than wages in Reno's
branch of the industry. On the other hand, if spillover effects dominate, higher wages in
Reno's WRT industry are expected, other things equal.
Employment in the WRT sector in Clark County is smaller than employment in the
HGR industry, but still accounted for 95,954 jobs in 1996. The WRT industry in Reno
has an estimated 36,065 jobs, which makes it slightly larger than its HGR sector (30,584
jobs). Nonetheless, both industries in each location are quite large as a proportion of total
employment. Third, the present study differs from recent research on union wage effects,
because occupational level data from a state wage survey are used rather than individual
. level data from a nationally representative sample. 8 Kochan & Helfman (1981) suggested
' Throughout the article Clark County and Las Vegas are used interchangeably, as are Washoe County and Reno.
5
The employment figures were obtained from NDETR (1996, p. 75). Figures on union coverage were obtained from union
officials and reflect coverage as of 1996.
6
The average union-nonunion differential in U.S. hotel industry for nonmanagerial, nonprofessional/technical workers is 18.7
percent. In Las Vegas the differential ranges from -3.8 to 4.6 percent depending on the specification of the wage equations
used in multi-variate statistical analysis (Waddoups, 1999b).
' Data used came from the Current Population Survey- Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) files for 1995 and 1996 to
generate point estimates of union density for the WRT industry statewide and in Clark and Washoe Counties. The estimates
were 7.6 percent statewide, 8.2 percent in Clark County, and I 0.2 percent in Washoe County. Small sample sizes may
produce some measurement error in the estimates, but they conform to expectations in light of national figures from Hirsch &
Macpherson (1997). The CPS data are commonly used to generate familiar labor market statistics such as the monthly
unemployment rate.
8
Use of aggregated occupational and industry data to test for union wage effects was common in earlier studies cited in the
classic work of Lewis (1963).
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Table 1
Standard Industrial Classifications for Industries and Other Information on the Data Used
in the Analysis
HU I EL~. GAMING ANU Kt::l;t'(t::A II UN (HGR)
Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps
and Other Lodging Places
Amusement and Recreation Services

WHULt::t;AL;_ A~ R_E_J_ ~ I KAUt:: (WR I )
Wholesale Trade:Durable Goods
Wholesale Trade: Nondurable Goods
Building Materials, Hardware,
Garden Supply, Mobile Home Dealers
General Merchandise Stores
Food Stores
[Automotive Dealers and Gasoline
Service Stations
[Apparel and Accessory Stores
Home Furniture, Furnishings, and
Equipment Stores
Eating and Drinking Places
!Miscellaneous Retail

ISAf\t1F'L_E INFORMAll_QN
!Clark County (Las Vegas)
Employees
Firms
144,979
Industry Size
823
Survey Size
186
135,481
Survey Responses
54
34,678
Response Rate
29.0%

I~AMI-'Lt:: INFURMA II UN
11..-lark County (Las Vegas)
Firms
Industry Size
6,225
653
Survey Size*
Survey Responses 141
21.6%
Response Rate

Employees
95,954
49,649
9,163

Washoe County (Reno)
Washoe County (Reno)
-'F-:ir'"'m".>s'=-_ __,E""m-'-":'pl':'oy'-:'e':'e~s
Firms
Employees
Industry Size
386
30,584
Industry Size
2,609
36,065
Survey Size
62
28,616
Survey Size
235
18,925
Survey Responses 21
11,280
Survey Responses
80
7,716
Response Rate
33.9%
Response Rates
34%
Source: Nevada Wages: An Occupational Wage Survey of Selected Nevada Regions and Industries,
Nevada Department of Employment, Training and Rehabilitation, 1996.
*Surveys given only to firms with 30+ employees.

that neither the approach using occupational nor individual level data is inherently
superior; although they pointed out that the two approaches provide different
information. The more common approach focuses on the individual as the unit of
analysis and estimates what a worker at a given point in time with a given set of
characteristics would earn in the presence of, and absence of, union coverage. To the
extent that such estimates of the union wage effect do not account for changes in hiring,
training, and other human resource policies that may have occurred over time in response
to the union presence, estimates of the union wage effect may be biased, arguably
downward.
In contrast, using occupational level data allows the researcher to assess how
changes in human resource practices that occur as a result of unionization may have
affected wages connected to jobs (rather than individuals) over time. Such a methodology
makes it more conducive to estimating the total historical effects of unionism on wages.
Consider how firms alter human resource policies in response to higher union wages. It is
likely that firms begin to screen applicants more carefully and consequently hire more
productive workers. Firms may also offer additional training so that wages and
productivity are in closer alignment. If some of the changes in productivity-related
characteristics originating from altered human resource practices are observed in the data
at the individual level and are controlled for in multi-variate analysis (a technique
commonly used to assess union wage effects), then the impact of unions on wages will be
understated. For example, the source of higher wages may be attributed to more
education or increased training. However, because the occupational wage incorporates
employers' responses to unionism over time, it allows the researcher to obtain a better
measure of the total historical effects ofunions on wages, a measure which is better
UNLVGaming Research & Review Journal • Volume 6, Issue 1
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suited for estimating what may have occurred in the absence of unions, or what may
occur if unionization disappeared and human resource policies drifted back to a
nonunion configuration. 9
Finally, as discussed in the introduction, the present study holds currency because
the spread oflegalized gambling and its effects on the nation's social and economic
health has resulted in more interest generally in HGR industries around the nation. The
formation of a National Gaming Impact Study Commission itself suggests that research
on HGR's growing importance to local, regional, and the national economies is
becoming increasingly timely.

Unionization in Nevada's HGR Industry
Unionization is an important institutional feature of the labor market in Las Vegas,
where the HGR industry employed 26.4 percent of the workforce as of the 1996 survey,
many of which are represented by the Culinary Union, Local226 and the Bartenders
Union, Local165. Affiliated with the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
International Union, the two locals represented nearly 40,000 workers as of 1996, mostly
at major Las Vegas "Strip" properties. Other
unions such as the International Union of
In all, over 48 percent of
Operating Engineers (stationary), the
Clark County's nonmanagerial,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
nonprofessional, and nontechnical
International Association of Theatrical and
Stage Employees, the Carpenters Union, and workers in the HGR industry were unionized
the Musicians Union of Las Vegas represent
in 1996 compared to an estimate of 19 percent
maintenance workers, front-desk clerks,
of the same group of workers nationwide
drivers, stage hands, and musicians, among
others. In all, over 48 percent of Clark
County's nonmanagerial, nonprofessional,
and nontechnical workers in the HGR
industry were unionized in 1996 compared to an estimate of 19 percent of the same
group of workers nationwide (Waddoups, 1999c ).
A majority of establishments on the Las Vegas "Strip," such as Caesar's Palace,
Circus-Circus, The Mirage, and The MGM Grand are unionized, as are a substantial
proportion of major "Downtown" properties located on and around Fremont Street. An
expanding segment of"Neighborhood" hotel-casinos has also emerged away from the
tourist corridor. Such properties generally attract a higher proportion of their patrons
from the local area and have little union presence. Pockets of isolated nonunion hotelcasino development are also found in Clark County on the California-Nevada border
(about 40 miles southwest of Las Vegas), in Laughlin near the Arizona border (about 70
miles southeast of Las Vegas), and in Mesquite on the Arizona border near Utah (about
90 miles northeast of Las Vegas). In contrast, as stated above, only one property
representing approximately 500 workers was unionized in Reno as of 1996.

Data and Methodology
To examine how unions affect wages in Nevada's HGR and WRT industries,
Nevada's state wage survey is used. The survey is conducted annually by the NDETR to
gather data on wages and employment from a sample of private sector employers with 30
or more employees. Table 1 (panel 1) contains a listing of the types of enterprises that
compose the two industries. Nearly 1,100 employers representing a broad cross-section
of industries participated in the 1996 survey. Because ofNevada's unique industrial
structure, the NDETR formed HGR as a separate industrial category within a more
9

Important prerequisites for the wage survey to be an effective data source for studying union wage effects in the present study
are small union-nonunion wage differentials in Las Vegas, the virtual absence of unionism in Reno's branch of the industry,
and a similar level of unionization in both locations in the comparison (WRT) industry.
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broadly defined "Services" industry. The WRT industry was judged by the author to
contain employers competing for similarly skilled workers in the same labor markets,
and thus was chosen as a comparison group to the HGR industry.
To obtain its sample of wages in HGR and WRT firms, the NDETR developed a
random selection criterion that gave larger firms a higher probability of receiving a
survey. Recipients of the survey were asked to list the number of workers who fit a
particular occupational definition, the number of hours each employee worked, the
individual rate of pay excluding tips and other compensation as of March 1, 1996, and to
classify each worker as "entry-level" or "journey-level." Only data on "journey-level"
workers -- those capable of working without direct technical supervision -- were
disaggregated by county; therefore, only journey-level workers were the focus of the
study. The NDETR sent follow-up letters to non-respondents after six weeks
encouraging their participation. They obtained total response rates of 29.0 percent in
Clark County and 33.9 percent in Washoe County for the HGR industry and 21.6 percent
in Clark County and 34.0 percent in Washoe County for the WRT industry. Table 1
(panels 2 and 3) displays information on the sample, including industry size, the number
of firms who received a survey, and response rates.
The official description of the data described no attempts by the NDETR to test for
any non-response bias. It appears, however, that no patterns of non-response bias
emerged with respect to firm size. The average size of non-respondents was slightly
smaller in Las Vegas than the size of respondents, while just the reverse was true of nonrespondents in Reno.
Of the HGR firms in Clark County who were sent the survey, the mean number of
employees was 728. The mean for WRT was 76 employees, clearly a smaller number.
The analogous numbers for employees in firms responding to the survey averaged 642
and 65, respectively in the HGR and WRT industries in Washoe County, following the
same pattern as in Las Vegas with respect to firm size. No information on the distribution
or dispersion of firm sizes was provided, making it difficult to statistically test for
differences in the two distributions or differences in average firm size within the two
industries. The responding firms, however, represented 24 percent of the HGRjobs in
Clark County's sampling universe and 10.5 percent of the WRT jobs in Clark County.
The analogous figures for Washoe County are 36.9 for HGR and 19.9 for WRT.
Another potential source of non-response bias is under- or over-representation of
firms by union status. The NDETR reported no information on union status. While lack
of such information is not a problem in Reno because of the near absence of
unionization, circumstances are different in Clark County. One piece of evidence
suggesting that unionized firms were probably not undercounted was that median wages
of many of the key, highly unionized occupations were identical with the union wage
scale in typical contracts (Waddoups, 2000b, Table 2). Whether such firms were overrepresented in the sample is more difficult to determine. The fact that not all median
wages of generally unionized occupations in the survey corresponded exactly with the
union scale, however, does suggest a significant participation of nonunion firms in the
survey. The lack of data on firm characteristics makes it difficult to say anything
definitive about non-response bias along the union dimension.
From employers' survey responses, the NDETR calculated means, medians, and
interquartile ranges of a wide array of occupational wages in the two counties. To
facilitate comparison, only occupations whose wages appeared in both locations were
included, which left 51 pairs of occupation-industry median wages from HGR and 35
pairs from WRT in the final sample.
Median wages for occupations in Clark and Washoe County's HGR industry are
compared in Table 2. For most occupations outside the Managerial and Professional
categories the sample sizes are quite large, which increases the precision of the estimates
of median wages. Notice also that the sample sizes are substantially larger in Las Vegas
because of the larger size of the industry. In addition to information on median wages in
UNLVGaming Research & Review Journal• Volume 6, Issue 1
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Las Vegas and Reno, Table 2 contains the difference and percent difference in the median
wage for each occupation. The percent difference is calculated using Reno's wage as the
denominator (the practice of placing the nonunion wages in the denominator is common
in the literature measuring union-nonunion wage differentials). The final column in Table
2 indicates occupations where a substantial union presence exists. Of the 51 occupations
listed for the HGR industry, 21 are considered "highly unionized" in Clark County. 10
Table 2
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County {Las Vegas) and Washoe
{Hotel, Recreation, and Gaming)
Num. of
Num. of Num. of
Workers Median
Firms
Firms
Clark
washoe
Clark
Occupation
Clark
Managerial and Administrative Occugations
Chefs, Executive
Managers, Casino

Managers, Financial and Controllers
Managers, Food and Beverage
Managers, General and Top Executives
Managers. Hotel

Managers. Marketing, Advert., Pub. Relations
Managers, Human Resources

Num. of

Workers
Washoe

Union

Median
Perc. in
Washoe Diff. Diff. Clark ctx

15
13
28
26
16
16
18
19

17
26
50
99
35
20
30
30
307

29.38
19.94
23.04
13.52
48.08
25.05
19.23
20.83
24.88

10
7
14
10
8
11
8
8

14
15
23
21
19
14
17
15
138

21.92
20.03
24.87
15.18
57.69
19.71
21.15
20.53
25.14

7.46 34%
-0.09
0%
-1.83 -7%
-1.66 -11%
·9.61 ·17%
5.34 27%
-1.92 -9%
0.30
1%
-0.25 -1%

no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no

10
20
8
6

21
36
19
17

13.86
13.37
20.60
15.77
15.90

9
8
6
6

21
29
13
13

14.42
12.41
18.27
18.39
15.87

-0.56 -4%
0.96
8%
2.33 13%
-2.62 -14%
0.03
0%

no
no
no
no

Average
Profess1onal Para~rofessional. and Technical
Accountants
Administrative Assts.
Casino Hosts, Executive
Computer Programmers
Average

County {Reno)

=
Table 2 {cont.)
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County {Las Vegas) and Washoe
{Hotel, Recreation, and Gaming)
Num. of Num. of
Num. of
Firms
Firms
Workers Median
Occupation
Clark
Clark
Washoe
Clark
Sales and Related Occu(;!ations
Cashiers. Casino Cage
Change Persons, Gaming
Clerks, Currency Counting
Salespersons. Retail
Average
Clerical and Administrative SuQ(;!Ort
Bill and Account Collectors
Clerks, Accounting

Clerks, Hotel Desk
Clerks, Payroll
Clerks, Personnel

Clerks, Traffic, Shipping and Receiving
Computer Operators

Secretaries, Except Legal and Medical
Switchboard Operators
Average

10

County {Reno)
Num. of
Union
Workers Median
Perc. in
Washoe Washoe Oiff. Diff. Clark Cty

30
28
24
13

486
1312
332
277

10.01
8.72
8.46
7.50
8.67

15
15
10
5

185
416
68
60

7.04
6.75
7.43
7.04
7.07

2.97 42%
1.97 29%
1.03 14%
046
7%
1.61 23%

no
yes
no
no

12
23
29
22
17
13
6
19
17

30
164
531
81
48
37
34
88
235

11.71
9.00
11.45
10.00
9.00
9.69
11.73
10.45
11.25
10.48

6
9
9
6
6
4
5
9
8

16
60
78
12
12
10
18
54
57

9.17
9.07
8.00
8.50
8.43
8.00
10.72
10.29
7.04
8.80

2.54 28%
-0.07 -1%
345 43%
1.50 18%
0.57
7%
1.69 21%,
1.01
9%
0.16
2%
4.21 60%
1.67 19%

no
no
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
yes

Occupations were assigned "highly unionized" status based on an examination of union contracts and after consultation with a
former human resource executive of a major unionized hotel. In Table 2, "Union in Clark" heads this column.
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Table 2 (cont.)
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County (Las Vegas) and Washoe County (Reno)
(Hotel, Recreation, and Gaming)

Occupation
SeiVice Occupations
Baggage Porters and Bellhops
Bakers, Bread and Pastry
Bartenders
Casino Hosts, Nonexecutive
Chefs
Cooks, Restaurant
Cooks. Short Order
Dealers, Blackjack
Dealers, craps
Dining Room Attendants Bartender Helpers
Food Preparation and Service Workers (fast food)
Guards, Security and Watch (unarmed)
Hosts, Hostesses
Housekeepers
Janitors and Cleaners

Num. of Num. of
Firms
Workers Median
Clark
Clark

22
8
31

11
21
26
10
23
17
21
16
23
16
19
30

Keno Runners

11

Keno Writers

14
28
29
22
27
25

Kitchen Helpers, Porters, Dishwashers
Maids and Room Cleaners
Supervisors, Gaming
Supervisors. Slots
Waiters and Waitresses

Num. of
Firms
Washoe

Clark

7.67
12.37
11.88
13.44
14.38
12.07
10.53
4.58
4.65
7.21
7.91
10.88
10.92
8.75
9.52
6.50
7.50
9.37
9.25
19.69
10.41
7.44
9.86

393
78
559
52
92
469
94

2211
718
634
215
775
197
238
1112
82
135
815
2254
565
493
1141

Average

6

Union
Median
Perc. in
Washoe Diff. Diff. Clark Cty

61
52
239
24

13

4
11

44

13
6
12

262
95
1174
208
290
78
270
94
38
428
36
132
342
444
281
238
554

7
11
10
12
7
12
14

5
10
17
12
12
15
15

Table 2 (cont.)
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County (Las Vegas) and Washoe
_(Hotel, Recreation, and Gaming)
Num. of Num. of
Num. of
Workers Median
Firms
Firms
Clark
Clark
Washoe
Clark
,Occupation
Production Construction. Operating. Maint.
and Material Handling Occupations
26
256
19.22
Maintenance Repairers. General Utility
207
7 44
Parking Lot Attendants
13
Slot Machine Repairers
26
210
16.52
Supervisors, Maintenance Workers
19
65
16.94
, Average
15.03
Overai!Average
13.11
10.50
Average Unionized in Clark County
Average not Uniomzed in Clark County
14.94
'source: Nevada Wages: An Occupational Wage Survey of Selected Nevada Regions and
Employment. Training and Rehabilitation. 1996.

Num. of
Workers
Washoe

5.22
9.62
6.60
10.84
14.27
8.48
7.75
5.14
4.75
4.75
6.50
8.50
6.25
6.41
6.90
5.90
6.75
6.00
6.39
15.00
7.63
4.90
7.48

2.45
2. 75
5.28
2.60
0.11
3.59
2.78
-0.56
-0.10
2.46
1.41
2.38
4.67
2.34
2.62
0.60
0.75
3.37
2.86
4.69
2. 78
2.54
2.38

47%
29%
80%
24%
1%
42%
36%
-11%
-2%
52%
22%
28%
75%
37%
38%
10%
11%
56%
45%
31%
36%
52%
32%

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
no
yes

County (Reno)
Num. of
Workers
Washoe

11
4
12
8

Union
Median
Perc. in
Washoe Diff. Diff. Clark Cty

123
93
99
18

12.42 6.80 55%
4.25 3.19 75%
12.28 4.24 35%
16.52 0.42
3%
11.37 3.66 32%
11.41 1.70 24%
7.49 3.01 40%
14.16 0. 78
6%
Industries, Nevada Department of

yes
yes
no
no

Nearly identical information from the WRT industry in Las Vegas and Reno is
compiled in Table 3. Notice that relatively large sample sizes for each occupation suggest
that estimates of the population medians are likely to be quite reliable. Unlike Table 2,
Table 3 does not contain a "Union in Clark" column, because union densities are virtually
the same in both sectors and do not represent a substantial proportion of workers in
occupations within the WRT industry in either Clark or Washoe Counties (see footnote 8).
Table 3
Comparison of Median Occupational Wages in Clark County (Las Vegas) and Washoe County (Reno)
(Wholesale and Retail Trade)
Num. of
Num. of
Num. of
Num. of
Firms
Workers
Median
Firms
Workers
Median
Occupation
Diff.
Clark Cty Clark Cty Clark Cty Washoe
Washoe
Washoe
Managerial and Administrative Occupations
Managers, Fast Food
11
10
54
11.54
8.95 2.59
64
34
Managers, Financial and Controllers
14
44
14
27.69
23.6 4.09
Managers, Food and Beverage
20
24
15.00
12
13.30 1.70
64
Managers, General and Top Exec.
51
89
28.85
65
37
28.37 0.48
Managers, Marketing, Advert. etc.
15
10
20.48 2.97
23.45
18
Managers, Sales
37
21
44
18.79 3.66
22.45
118
Managers, Warehouse
21
19
28
18.94 -2.67
16.27
28
Average
20.75
18.92 1.83
Professional Paraprofessional and Technical Occupations
Accountants
16
Buyers, wholesale, Retail Except Farm Products
14
Average

22
19

14.42
16.45
15.44

7

14
13

Perc.
Diff.
28.9%
17.3%
12.8%
1.7%
14.5%
19.5%
-14.1%
9.7%

16.56 -2.14 -12.9%
14.95 1.50 10.0%
15.76 -0.32 -1.4%
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The Impact of HGR Unions on Wages
The results in Table 2 clearly demonstrate a substantial wage premium for workers in
Las Vegas employed in highly unionized occupations in the HGR industry. The wage
premium for such occupations averages 40 percent. That is, the typical worker in Las
Vegas working as, for example, a baggage porter, kitchen helper, or guest room attendant
(maid), among other highly unionized occupations, earns an average of 40 percent more
in hourly wages than his or her counterparts in the identical occupations in Reno.
Are there differences in industry characteristics in Las Vegas that generate such a
wage premium independent of unions? If such differences exist and lead to higher wages
independent of union status, then one may expect workers in occupations not classified as
highly unionized in Las Vegas's HGR industry to also earn substantially higher wages
than their counterparts in Reno. Results in Table 2 indicate that such workers enjoy only 6
percent higher median wages on average relative to their co-workers in identical
occupations in Reno. Thus some differences in wages across the two regions may arise
from a difference in the structures of the HGR industries in the two cities favoring Las
Vegas; however, the magnitude of the differences between the union and nonunion
occupations (40 percent compared to 6 percent) suggests that union representation of
workers in Las Vegas is very likely to remain a major component of a reasonable
explanation of higher wages observed there.
Notice also that differences in median wages for some occupations listed in Table 2
are quite remarkable. For example, maids and room cleaners (an untipped occupation) in
Las Vegas enjoy a 45 percent wage premium over the same occupation in Reno. Kitchen
helpers, porters, and dishwashers (also untipped) are typically paid 56 percent more than
workers in the identical occupations in Reno. The largest premium, however, goes to
workers in tipped occupations. For example, bartenders in Las Vegas receive an 80
percent wage premium over bartenders in Reno.
Hourly wages in the NDETR data do not include tips, which likely causes an
overstatement of the Las Vegas-Reno differential for bartenders and other tipped
employees. To see why an upward bias may occur, consider figures in Table 2 showing
food servers in Reno earning $4.90 per hour while their counterparts in Las Vegas earn
$7.44 per hour, a 51.8 percent premium for workers in Las Vegas. Now, add a hypothetical
$10.00 per hour in tips to each wage. The wage premium drops to 17 percent. Table 2
shows that tipped occupations generally exhibit the largest wage differentials, which
suggests that using only the base wage may overstate the union effect. The NDETR data,
however, also do not include fringe benefits, which likely tends to offset any upward bias
from the exclusion of tips. Furthermore, Waddoups (1999c) demonstrated that differences
in the distribution of median wages among occupations with a union presence in Las
Vegas and the identical occupations in Reno was statistically significant.
A finding of higher wages in Las Vegas compared to Reno is not particularly
surprising in light of previous research demonstrating that the extent of unionization in an
industry positively affects wages ( Belman & Voos, 1993; Cain, Becker, McLaughlin, &
Scwhenk, 1981; Delaney, 1981; Freeman & Medoff, 1985; Perloff & Sickles, 1991). But
the studies cited above used individual level data and were able to control for
productivity-related characteristics such as experience, education, and job tenure. The
present study partially controls for variation in such characteristics by using the median
wage of an occupation as the unit of analysis. For example, it is doubtful that sufficient
differences exist in the characteristics of the median guest room attendant in Las Vegas
compared to her counterpart in Reno that would warrant a 45 percent wage premium.
Other differences in the two markets that may be responsible for differences in wages will
be discussed below.
Results in Table 2 leave little doubt that union representation among occupations in
Las Vegas's HGR industry has a profound effect on wages and the wage structure within
the HGR industry. Higher wages and benefits that are provided for in union contracts
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increase living standards and reduce social costs associated with higher levels of
employment at poverty level wages (refer back to footnote 2 for an example).
But does the existence of such an effect influence wages in other sectors of the
economy? To determine the impact on other industries, refer to median wages for
matched pairs of 35 occupations in the WRT industry in Las Vegas and Reno displayed in
Table 3. As mentioned earlier, unions are not dominant in either geographic location in
the WRT industry and the union density is comparable in both areas, thus median wages
are not consistent with the union scale in either Las Vegas or Reno. Results in Table 3
indicate that in occupations listed under the "Clerical and Administrative Support,"
"Services" and "Production, Construction, etc." categories; that is, in occupations in
which non-HGR firms are most likely to be competing for workers with HGR firms,
there appears to be somewhat of a wage advantage for occupations in Reno. For example,
the typical clerical worker in Las Vegas makes 8.9 percent less than his or her counterpart
in Reno. The analogous figure for "Services" and "Production" categories is .9 and 6.2
percent less, respectively. Overall, workers in Las Vegas's WRT are paid 2.2 percent less
than their counterparts in Reno. Waddoups (1999c) found no statistical significance at
conventional levels for such differences, although results on clerical workers came close
to statistical significance with a p-value of .063. Compare these results to a 24 percent
wage advantage for workers in Las Vegas's HGR industry. Overall, higher union wages in
the HGR industry in Las Vegas do not seem to translate into lower wages in its WRT
industry via the spillover effect as defined above. Nor does the heavy unionization
increase wages in the WRT as the threat, consumer demand, and wage relatively
hypotheses would suggest, although the possibility remains that the two opposing forces
cancel each other out.
The evidence presented here seems to contradict the findings of Kahn (1978), who
also compared a highly unionized city (San Francisco) with a less unionized city (Los
Angeles), finding that nonunion service sector workers in San Francisco earned
significantly lower wages than their nonunion counterparts in Los Angeles. Other studies
either found no evidence of inter-industry effects (Hirsch & Neufeld, 1987; Hundley,
1987) similar to the present study, or a positive correlation between union density and
wages of nonunion workers (Curme & Macpherson, 1991; Neumark & Wachter, 1995).1t
must be remembered that even though some workers in the WRT industry are unionized,
because the union density is quite low, the median occupational wage most likely reflects
pay resembling a nonunion wage.
It appears that higher union wages in the HGR industry do not obviously come at the
expense of other similarly-skilled workers outside the industry. Such a finding is
important for policy makers, conununity leaders, union leaders, and managers in the
gaming sector, who must consider the complexities of the union wage effects on the
social and economic well-being of the community as a whole.

Discussion and Conclusions
Higher wages in a vast majority of cases translate into higher living standards.
Workers in the HGR industry where wages are higher and fringe benefits are more
readily available are more stable, less likely
to rely on services provided at the
It appears that higher union wages in the community's expense, and more likely to be
HGR industry do not obviously come at the active participants in the economy and
expense of other similarly-skilled workers society. To the extent that a union wage
encourages such outcomes, fewer
outside the industry. premium
social and economic costs are likely to be
borne by the conununity. Thus from a socioeconomic perspective, especially in the HGR industry with its abundance of jobs at the
lower end of the skill hierarchy, union representation and the accompanying wage
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premium may alleviate some (though certainly not all) of the socio-economic costs that
would otherwise be borne by the community.
Any conclusions derived from the present analysis must be interpreted in light of
differences in the economies of Las Vegas and Reno that may affect wages independent
of unionization. Because only two regions and two industries are the subject of study, the
discussion must remain qualitative. Examples of factors that may cause wages to differ
are the regulatory environment, industry structure, employment composition,
employment and population growth, unemployment, cost-of-living, city size, and
variation in non-pecuniary amenities.
The Nevada State Gaming Control Board regulates gaming operations in Nevada
according to a uniform set of rules consistently applied to hotel-casinos throughout the
state, rendering the regulatory playing field in Las Vegas and Reno level. Differences in
wages, therefore, are not influenced by variation in regulatory policy.
In the present context, industry structure refers to the degree of market power hotelcasinos enjoy in their respective regions. Previous research has demonstrated that
oligopolistic market structures are generally characterized by higher than normal profit
margins. Because higher profits reduce firms' will to resist union wage demands and
allow union negotiators to push for increased wages with fewer negative employment
effects, workers in such industries often capture a portion of extra-normal profits through
higher wages (Stewart, 1990).
A readily available measure of market power for hotel-casinos in the two regions is
profitability. Hotel-casinos in Reno generated higher profit margins than their
counterparts in Las Vegas for 5 of the 7 years between 1990 and 1996, indicating the
possible existence of monopoly rents for capture by HGR workers in Reno. On the other
hand, figures describing revenue-per-employee are substantially lower in Reno,
suggesting that hotel-casinos may not have the cash flow to pay higher wages in Reno, or
perhaps that casinos in Las Vegas have substituted capital for relatively expensive union
labor (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 1990-96).
Though hotel firms in Reno are definitely smaller than their counterparts in Las
Vegas, the top 10 firms with respect to employment in both locations each employ more
than 500 workers, which was a figure used by Podgursky ( 1986) as the lower bound in
the definition of "large" firms. 11 The industry structure in Las Vegas and Reno differs to
some extent, but no compelling evidence emerges to indicate that market structures in the
two areas diverge to the point that comparison of wages in the two areas becomes unduly
problematic.
Employment composition in the local labor market may also affect wages in the two
areas (Kahn, 1978). Using national data, Hirsch & Macpherson (1997) demonstrated that
wages vary substantially by industry. If a region has a high concentration of employment
in high wage industries, other things equal, wages in lower paying industries may be bid
upwards. The most notable differences in employment composition between Clark and
Washoe Counties are in the construction, manufacturing, HGR, and public administration
industries. Washoe County employs a greater share in manufacturing and public
administration and Clark County employs a larger proportion in construction and HGR.
According to Hirsch & Macpherson ( 1997), average hourly wages in construction and
manufacturing were $13.66 and $14.33, respectively, while wages in public
administration averaged $16.06. The average wage in the service industry, which includes
HGR, is $13.29. The fact that employment in Las Vegas tends toward lower paying
industries (construction and services) points to greater upward pressure on wages in
Reno's branch of the HGR industry. Such results suggest that industry composition is not
a compelling explanation of the observed wage differentials.
Another possible determinant of higher wages in the Las Vegas HGR industry is the
higher rate of employment growth in the area. Employment grew at an average of 5.48
11

Reno's lOth ranked hotel in terms of employment employs 850 workers (NDETR. 1998).
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percent annually in Las Vegas compared to 1.95 percent in Reno over the 1989-95 period
(Nevada Department of Administration, 1996). Of course, expansion in labor demand
raises wages only if labor supply grows more slowly. Population expanded at a 5.40
percent annual rate in Las Vegas, a rate slightly lower than the growth of employment at
5.48 percent. Reno's population grew at a 1.96 percent rate, nearly identical to its 1.95
percent rate of expansion in employment (Nevada State Demographer's Office, 1998). 12
Using population and employment as proxies for labor supply and demand, it appears that
more upward pressure on wages is expected in Las Vegas, though the slight .08
percentage point difference in annual employment and population growth rates is not
particularly compelling. 13
The unemployment rate also summarizes supply and demand conditions in a labor
market. A significantly higher unemployment rate in one of the regions would lead one to
expect downward pressure on wages. Over the relevant period, higher unemployment
rates were experienced in Las Vegas. 14 Tighter labor markets, thus, would lead to an
expectation of greater upward pressure on wages in Reno. Thus, unemployment rates
remain oflittle use in explaining the lower wages in Reno's HGR industry.
Differences in living costs are another factor that may influence wage differentials.
Other things equal, wages are expected to be positively correlated with living costs. Costof-living indicators unambiguously point to higher prices in Reno over the relevant
period. The American Chamber of Commerce Research Association compiled cost-ofliving indexes for major U.S. cities. A city with an average cost-of-living was assigned a
score of 100. Compared to such a hypothetical city, Las Vegas scored 102.6, slightly
higher than average, while Reno scored 114.0 (Matthews, 1997). Because prices were
approximately 10.5 percent higher in Reno according to such estimates, higher wages
were expected there as well. Living costs, therefore, are not a plausible explanation for
lower wages in Reno.
Differences in city size may cause wages in Las Vegas and Reno to differ. Although
Las Vegas and Reno were considered small cities (less than a million in population) when
the data were gathered, Las Vegas was approaching medium-sized status (generally
defined as 1 to 2.5 million in population). The Las Vegas metropolitan area officially
passed the one million resident mark in 1997. Waddoups (1999b) found a union wage
premium of 5 to 10 percent for non-managerial and nonprofessional/technical production
hotel workers employed in medium-sized cities across the U.S. city size, thus, may
partially explain higher wages in Las Vegas's HGR industry.
Finally, differences in non-pecuniary amenities may be responsible for the observed
differences in wages. Locations with a relative abundance of non-pecuniary amenities
may be able to attract workers at lower wage levels than other locations with fewer
amenities. Though such an argument appears plausible, to the author's knowledge no
research that addresses the relative importance of pecuniary and non-pecuniary
characteristics between the two locations has been conducted. Furthermore, it can be
hypothesized that higher rates of population growth and in-migration observed in Las
Vegas compared to Reno may indicate a higher level of non-pecuniary amenities in Las
Vegas. Additional research on the determinants of migration into Nevada that carefully
differentiates between pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivation would be required to
further understand the impact of non-pecuniary amenities on local wage levels.
The discussion of how factors other than unionization may influence wage
differences points to the difficulty in drawing a definitive conclusion on the magnitude of
union wage effects. Not only is it difficult to judge the relative importance of each factor,
12

Because the Las Vegas area is substantially larger than Reno, a percent increase in population adds substantially more
individuals to the area. For example a one percent change in Las Vegas's 1999 population translates into approximately 12,500
people. For the Reno area a one percent change means just over 3,100 people.
" Population may be a poor proxy for expansion of labor supply in Las Vegas because of the relatively large number of new
residents who are retirees.
14
The NDETR reports the unemployment rates in the Las Vegas metropolitan area at 5.5 percent in 1995 and 1996. In the Reno
metropolitan area, the rates were 4.8 and 4.6 percent for the two years. Furthermore, during no year between 1992 and 1996
did the unemployment rate in Las Vegas fall below the rate in Reno (NDETR, 1998J.
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but some factors may be related to each other and to the level of unionization within the
industry. For example, an oligopolistic market structure may increase profitability and
wages compared to a more competitive structure, which in tum makes the profitable
location a more attractive target for union organizing. Successful union organizing then
generally leads to lower profitability. Although such complex interactions between
economic variables make it difficult to arrive at clean estimates of union wage effects,
there does not appear to be a systematic bias in the direction of higher wages in Las
Vegas from factors other than unionization.
The evidence presented above suggests that unions in the HGR industry substantially
influence the wage structure, raising the relative wages of non-managerial,
nonprofessional/technical workers. How do the high HGR wages affect pay levels of
similarly qualified workers in other less unionized industries? The data only tentatively
support the possibility of a mild spillover effect that outweighs threat, nonunion demand,
and wage relativity effects, which work to reduce wages of"clerical" workers in Las
Vegas's WRT industry. The results, however, are quite weak and may arise from such
factors as living costs, or higher demand for clerical workers stemming from a greater
share of government employment in Reno, among other factors not controlled in the
methodology.
To the extent that Washoe County's labor market is similar to the market in Clark
County, increased union density in the HGR industry in Reno is expected to raise the
wages of Washoe County's HGR industry workers. At the same time, little effect on
wages of similarly skilled workers in other industries is expected. Conversely, the
absence of unions in Las Vegas would likely lead to a reduction in wages of current nonmanagerial and nonprofessional/technical workers in the HGR's highly unionized
occupations over time as firms drifted back toward wage structures and human resource
practices commonly found in nonunion service sector employment. The concern first
raised in this article -the existence of social and economic costs borne by communities
whose employment base includes an abundance of jobs paying at or near the poverty
level -would then likely become an even more important issue for communities and the
industry. In addition, results of the present analysis suggest that workers within the Las
Vegas HGR industry, but employed in occupations with little or no union presence, would
likely see little impact on their wages in response to a steep decline in unionism. Workers
in other industries (like the WRT industry) who possess similar skills to unionized HGR
employees, similarly, would likely see little change in wages if the current high levels of
unionism were to be substantially diminished.
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